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 The purpose of the current study is to examine how ideology and situational factors shape 
terrorist target selection in the United States. While a growing number of studies have examined 
target selection by terrorists, the current study is the first to consider how combinations of factors 
present situated opportunities for terrorists to select particular types of targets as opposed to 
others. Guided by the situational crime prevention approach, this study relies on data from the 
American Terrorism Study (ATS) to measure attributes of incidents perpetrated by far-right and 
Islamic extremists and target selection. The outcomes of interest include government versus 
citizenry targets and human versus non-human targets. Bivariate and multivariate statistical tests 
are used to examine how ideology and situational factors statistically predict target selection. In 
addition, conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC) is used to examine how 
configurations of key factors are more or less associated with the selection of particular target 
types. Findings indicate that ideology and weapon type were two of the most significant factors 
associated with target selection by terrorists. The results of the CACC also revealed that some 
configurations of ideological and situational factors resulted in increased or decreased chances 
that terrorists would select one type of target over another, highlighting the interconnectedness of 
factors shaping target selection. This study concludes with implications for terrorism prevention 
and suggestions for future research.  
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Mass casualty events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks sparked the conversation on domestic terrorism in the United States. While scholarly 
research on terrorism began to increase in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, a series of high-profile 
terrorism events occurring around the turn-of-the-21st-century resulted in exponential growth in 
terrorism research (LaFree et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2008). With the United States facing 
continued threats of violence from the extreme far-right and Islamic extremists (Ebner, 2017; 
Freilich et al., 2018), one growing area of terrorism research is examining the factors that shape 
target selection.  
Consensus definitions of terrorism remain elusive (Borum, 2014; Ganor, 2002; 
Kundnani, 2012; Sedgwick, 2010), but most researchers and policymakers agree that terrorism is 
unique from more routine crimes in that the targets are often symbolic of a larger political or 
social motive. High-profile cases highlight some of the key factors shaping the target selection 
process. For example, anti-government extremist Timothy McVeigh selected the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for his attack because it housed multiple 
federal and state government agencies. Along with political symbolism, practical implications 
like target location and accessibility to certain types of weapons may also shape target selection 
decisions. In June of 2015, white supremacist Dylan Roof entered the Charleston South Carolina 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church and killed nine African Americans attending 
Bible study. One year later, ISIS supporter Omar Mateen opened fire at a gay nightclub in 
Orlando, Florida, killing almost 50 clubgoers and injuring many more. In both attacks, targets 
were assessed as vulnerable by terrorists, easily accessible with no physical security measures or 
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measures that could be easily subdued. Moreover, both targets were attractive to terrorists 
because they were occupied with a large number of unarmed civilians who represented social 
minority groups demonized by terrorists’ ideologies.  
Prior research has found that several factors help to shape terrorists’ selection of targets, 
including ideology (Ahmed, 2018; Asal et al., 2009; Becker, 2014 Drake, 1998, Hoffman, 1998) 
and an increasing desire to attack “softer” targets (Sandler, 2014). Less is known, however, about 
other potential situational and background factors that might shape target selection. Thus far, 
researchers have explored target selection by a single type of terrorist such that how target 
selection compares across ideological motives remains unclear. In addition, prior research on 
terrorist target selection have conceptualized potential factors shaping target selection as 
independent of one another. It is likely, however, that those factors shaping target selection do 
not operate in isolation but instead in combination to attract or deter terrorists.  
The Current Study  
The purpose of this study is to examine how combinations of event-level factors, 
including situational and target-specific attributes, influence terrorist target selection by extreme 
far-right and radical Islamic terrorists. The framework of the study is guided by situational crime 
prevention (SCP), which has been used by criminologists for decades to understand and reduce 
opportunities for crime to occur (Clarke, 1980). Previous work has tended to conceptualize 
elements of criminal and terrorist opportunity (e.g., exposure, security, weapon use, etc.) in 
isolation. In contrast, the current study draws from data provided by the American Terrorism 
Study (ATS) to investigate how elements of terrorist opportunity operate in combination to shape 
terrorist decision-making about target selection. More specifically, this study draws from Clarke 
& Newman’s (2006) conceptualizations of target vulnerability and attractiveness to better 
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understand how particular target attributes shape whether they will be selected by terrorists. Also 
of interest will be how terrorist co-offending, weapon sophistication, and the distance travel to 
commit attacks increase the likelihood that particular types of targets will be selected. The study 
will seek to answer the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1 - How do situational factors and target-specific attributes of 
attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection? 
Research Question 1a - How do particular combinations of situational factors and 
measures of target attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection?  
 
The analysis for the study occurs in two steps. First, I examine the statistical relationships 
between elements of terrorist opportunity and target selection of targets for both extreme far-
right and radical Islamic terrorists based on a series of binary logistic regression models. Second, 
I explore how various combinations of event-level factors are more or less associated with 
different target types using analytical techniques of Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations 











Theoretical Orientation and Literature Review 
Early sociological and criminological theories of crime sought a more informed 
understanding of the underlining causal mechanisms leading to criminal behavior. In the late 
19th century, social theories focused on biological determinism, examining how biological 
markers inherent from birth influence criminal propensity. Ceasare Lambroso (1911) argued that 
criminals were atavistic or biologically different than non-criminals. By the early to mid 20th 
century, scholars were studying how the social makeup of communities and the inability to attain 
the American dream were fueling crime (Merton, 1938; Shaw and McKay, 1942). While these 
theories were important in understanding the underlying mechanisms that push and pull 
individuals to commit crime, some environmental scholars argued that prominent social theories 
of crime ignored the role of place in shaping the occurrence of crime.  
In response, the Chicago School began studying how place shaped the nature of crime 
(Park and Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Chicago was a rising urban center at the 
time, leading scholars to see the city as an ideal setting to study how the urban environment 
impacts the social world. Analyzing the urban impact on society, Parks and Burgess (1925) 
noticed unique areas within the urban city and developed areas known as concentric zones. 
Zones such as the central business district and the working-class zone were unique in the social 
makeup of the area and thus were impacted by society differently. Examining the environmental 
characteristics of immigrant neighborhoods around Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1942) proposed 
that poverty, residential stability and ethnic heterogeneity were high correlates of crime and 
delinquency. This became known as social disorganization theory, which displayed the 
importance of examining the spatio-temporal variability of crime.  
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By the early 1970s, crime control strategies such as deterrence and rehabilitation were 
beginning to be viewed as largely unsuccessful. The term environmental criminology was first 
introduced by C.R. Jeffrey in 1971, when he insisted that the focus of crime prevention should be 
on stopping crime before it ever occurs. Environmental criminology focuses on the acts of crime 
and how the surrounding built environment influences opportunities to commit crimes. One 
example of an environmental theory applied to crime is Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) (Jeffrey, 1971), which emphasizes how the built environment, 
such as street lights, can impact the likelihood of crime to occur at a certain place or time of day. 
Another popular application of environmental criminology is known as hot spot analysis, which 
describes the concentration of locations and patterns of criminal activity (Sherman et al., 1989). 
Based on this approach, police agencies across the world have developed strategies known as hot 
spot policing which allows agencies with limited resources to target hot spot areas where they 
believe crime is most likely to occur. The following sections cover the three main theoretical 
branches of environmental criminology, including 1) rational choice theory, 2) routine activities 
theory, and 3) crime pattern theory. 
 
Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice theory has its roots in the 18th century in what is considered the classical 
period of criminology with the work of Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria (1764) argued that individuals 
act in their own self-interest and evaluate the costs and benefits of committing crime. Crime is 
thought to be a choice of free-will and the best way to deter individuals from crime is through 
swift and severe punishment. Robert Keel (1997) describes the central themes of classical theory 
as human beings behaving as rational actors that freely choose their behavior, whether it is 
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engaging in conforming or deviant behavior. Rationality involves a calculation of cost benefit, 
weighing pleasure versus pain, and individuals typically chose decisions to maximize their own 
individual pleasure.  
After the emergence of competing schools of thoughts, the classical period laid dormant 
for many years until it was revived again in the 1980’s. Researchers began questioning the 
decision-making process of offenders and how it functions. Cornish and Clarke (1985/1986) 
introduced their version of rational choice theory, arguing that while individuals seek to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs, they are not perfectly rational in their decision 
making. Instead they are limited in scope by time and the availability of relevant information 
within the decision-making process. This addition to the theory becomes known as “bounded 
rationality.” Cornish and Clarke used this revised theory to better understand crime 
displacement, or the relocation of crime from one area to another as a result of policies and 
police intervention. They also argued that the decision-making process is crime specific, 
meaning that it can change depending on the types of crime (Cornish and Clarke, 1987).   
Rational choice theory has faced criticism, with opponents arguing that offenders are 
often impulsive and commit crimes spontaneously without planning or weighing out the costs 
and benefits (Benson and Sams, 2013; Carmichael and Piquero, 2004). In examining the illegal 
purchase of tobacco products by minors, Ogrady (2011) critiques rational choice theory by 
suggesting that not all offenders are rational beings. For example, Not Criminally Responsible on 
Account Due to Mental Disorder (NCRMD) offenders are deemed irrational in the eyes of the 
courts and are therefore not legally responsible for their actions. Proponents of rational choice 
theory argue that rationality is broad by definition and crimes that may seem against the self-
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interest of the offender often have benefits that are intangible such as excitement or status 
advancement (Cullen et al., 2006).  
 
Routine Activities Theory 
Routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) operates under the assumption that 
rational people are shaped by available opportunities within particular environments. 
Specifically, routine activity theory assumes that offenders are usually rational beings that weigh 
the costs and benefits of criminal activity and seek to maximize personal gain.  Routine activity 
theory contains elements of both a macro and micro level theory. The macro-level approach 
examines how the daily activities and patterns of movement within society impact rates of crime 
and trends, while the micro-level approach examines the situation in which crime is likely to 
occur  
Cohen and Felson relied on this approach to examine changes in daily activities of 
society post World War II. After World War II there was a dramatic change in the number of 
women in the workforce. The increased number of women with jobs outside of the home left 
houses empty for longer periods of time during the day. This also meant that more people were 
out in the community and coming into contact with others, thus increasing the opportunity for 
crime to occur. Cohen and Felson developed three elements that are all required for a crime to 
occur, including a 1) motivated offender that comes in contact with a 2) suitable target in the 3) 
absence of a capable guardian. If one of these three elements is absent, opportunities for crime 
decrease.  
Upon further development of the three main components of routine activities theory, 
Felson and Cohen (1980) describe a motivated offender as having “criminal inclinations and the 
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ability to carry out those inclinations” (Felson and Cohen, 1980, p.392). Having the intentions to 
commit crime is not enough but the offender must also have the means to act on their intentions. 
In describing a suitable target, Felson and Cohen develop four key elements: Value, Visibility, 
Access and Inertia. Value represents the symbolic importance of the target while visibility is the 
likelihood that the offender will be caught by law enforcement. Access measures the availability 
of routes to and from the target and inertia measures the factors that impact the difficulty to 
commit crime. Finally, capable guardians are able to oversee and protect potential targets (Felson 
and Cohen, 1980).  
 
Crime Pattern Theory 
A third influential theory under the umbrella of environmental criminology is 
Brantingham and Brantingham’s (1990) theory of crime patterns. Building from the assumptions 
of both rational choice and routine activities, the authors argue that crime does not occur 
randomly but instead occurs in patterns of concentrated areas. These areas of crime are defined 
as the place where the activity space of a motivated offender intersects with a target location. 
Activity spaces are common areas such as home, work or other commonly traveled areas such as 
shopping centers (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1990). 
Brantingham and Brantingham argue that just like nonoffenders, criminal offenders move 
in routine patterns to similar places throughout their day. The surrounding areas an offender 
encounters on their movement from place to place is known as the offender’s awareness space. 
While moving throughout their day, offenders become exposed to opportunities to commit 
crimes within their awareness space. These areas where offenders come into contact with 
opportunities to commit crimes are where crime is likely to occur. As such, areas outside of the 
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routine movements of offenders are less likely to be areas of criminal activities (Brantingham 
and Brantingham, 1990;  Eck and Weisburd, 2015). 
Situational Crime Prevention  
Building on the assumptions of rational choice, routine activities, and crime pattern 
theories, Ronald Clarke (1980) developed an application of these theories known as situational 
crime prevention (SCP), with the ultimate goal of reducing the opportunity of crime. Similar to 
that of Cohen and Felson (1979), Clarke critiques the scope of traditional theories of crime in 
that they are focused heavily on the dispositions or motivations to commit crime rather than the 
choices made by an offender when presented with the opportunity to commit crime. Thus, 
situational crime prevention is focused more on the setting(s) of opportunities of crime rather 
than the motivation of those committing crime. SCP places less emphasis of crime prevention by 
way of the criminal justice system and focuses more on the surrounding built environment. For 
example, adding security monitoring systems to businesses or placing bars on windows are 
measures that private citizens can implement to reduce opportunities for crime (Clarke, 1997).  
In further developing his strategy, Cornish and Clarke (2003) argues that situational 
crime prevention seeks to reduce crime by making the commission of crime less attractive. They 
propose that this is done in five ways: (1) increasing the difficulty of crime, (2) increasing the 
risk of getting caught, (3) reducing the rewards of offending, (4) by removing excuses for 
offending, (5) reducing temptations and provocations of committing crime. With each of these 
five strategies, Cornish and Clarke developed five direct techniques which became known as the 
25 techniques of situational crime prevention. Current research on crime displacement has shown 
situational crime prevention to be an effective application to reducing crime (Guerette and 
Bowers, 2009; Weisburd et al., 2006). 
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Situational Crime Prevention and Terrorism 
Traditionally, situational crime prevention has been focused on routine forms of street 
crime, however, in their book “Outsmarting the Terrorist” Clarke and Newman (2006) call for 
the application of situational crime prevention to terrorism. While the motivation between 
criminals committing typical offenses (e.g., burglary, assault, etc.) and those committing terrorist 
attacks might vary drastically, Clarke and Newman argue that the core tenets of environmental 
criminology are also applicable to terrorism prevention.  
Previous research comparing terrorism and other crimes has focused on five main 
differences: (1) the motivations for crime and terrorism are vastly different, (2) terrorists are 
much more determined than criminals, (3) terrorism requires much more planning and is less 
opportunistic than most crime, (4) terrorism depends on external funding, and (5) terrorism 
involves much larger-scale acts and can only be committed by organized groups (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006). Clarke and Newman argue against these differences, suggesting that the 
differences between terrorism and other crimes are actually few. They claim many terrorists are 
motivated by peer pressure or a sense of belonging, similar to other forms of crimes. They also 
argue that planning is no less complicated for terrorism attacks as sophisticated robberies, as they 
both rely heavily on planning and preparation. Finally, terrorism is not always large scale, as 
many attacks are on individuals or small groups as is traditional crimes and terrorists often turn 
to traditional crimes to secure their own funds rather than relying on external funding (Clarke 
and Newman, 2006).  
Clarke and Newman identify four pillars of the terrorism opportunity structure: targets, 
weapons, tools and facilitating conditions. Examples of targets include a seemingly endless 
number of places/people such as government facilities, businesses, or individuals that appear 
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attractive to attack. Not all potential targets appear equally attractive to terrorists, therefore it is 
unnecessary and practically impossible to equally protect all targets with situational crime 
prevention strategies. Instead, the most vulnerable targets need to be identified and prevention 
strategies focused towards them.  
Weapons play a vital role in both the availability of opportunities and types of potential 
targets terrorists can feasibly attack. The method of attack and the potential destruction of their 
ideological crime are in large part dependent on the weapon used. Weapon choice can depend on 
the level of resources available to the individual or terrorist organization as well as the level of 
knowledge it takes to use certain weapons. For example, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
require a certain skill set to build and detonate in comparison to other weapons such as 
handguns. Clarke and Newman (2006) argue that the most important feature of weapon choice is 
how easily obtainable it is. This helps explain why small arms and improvised explosives are 
popular among terrorists, because they are relatively easy to obtain. Reducing the availability of 
certain weapons is one step that law enforcement can take in reducing opportunities of terrorist 
attacks.  
While targets and weapons are the two primary pillars of terrorist opportunity, tools and 
facilitating conditions play a less, but sill important role. Tools include everyday items such as 
vehicles, identification badges or credit cards that are needed to carry out the planned attack. 
While these items are necessary in everyday life, Clarke and Newman argue that most of the 
tools are gathered through illegal means. If law enforcement can intercept terrorists as they are 
illegally collecting tools or make them less easily obtainable, they can in theory reduce 
opportunities of attack. Finally, facilitating conditions are certain societal conditions that 
generate favorable opportunities for crime. For example, policies, or a lack thereof, on firearm 
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controls are a facilitating condition shaping opportunities to gather firearms for an attack. Similar 
to targets, it is impossible to address and manage every facilitating condition. Identifying critical 
conditions that are amenable to change while providing the most preventative benefits is critical 
for counterterrorism efforts (Clarke and Newman, 2006).  
Criminologists have begun to apply situational crime prevention to specific crimes 
including terrorism. Clark (2009) examined the threat of bioterrorism attacks within the United 
States. He focused on weapons as a pillar of opportunity and concludes that the threat of 
biological weapons being used against the United States is minimal as it is extremely difficult to 
develop and unlikely to be used in a mass casualty attack (Clark, 2009). In another study, Yun 
(2009) focuses on another of the four pillars, examining how situational factors influence 
international terrorist organizations to commit kidnappings. Researchers have also applied 
situational crime prevention to violent attacks comparing suicide and non-suicide attacks and 
assassinations (Gruenewald et al., 2018; Mandala and Freilich, 2017). Not all terrorism incidents 
examined through a situational crime prevention framework are violent in nature, as Belli and 
Freilich (2009) apply this approach to non-violent tax related crimes committed by the extreme 
far-right.  
 
Target Selection  
Previous research on target selection in the context of terrorism has been focused on four 







The first pillar of opportunity that Clarke and Newman (2006) discuss is target selection. 
While most people or places could theoretically be a target of a potential attack, it is impractical 
to be able to protect all targets. Instead, they argue priority needs to be given to targets that 
appear more attractive to terrorists and thus are at a higher risk of being selected for an attack. In 
order to better understand what makes an attractive target, Clarke and Newman (2006) developed 
the acronym EVIL DONE encompassing target attributes: Exposed, Vital, Iconic, Legitimate, 
Destructible, Occupied, Near and Easy. Each feature of a specific location is given a score and 
targets with a higher score are seen as more vulnerable and attractive to future attacks than those 
with a lower score (Clarke and Newman, 2006).  
Boba (2009) further expanded Clarke and Newman’s conceptualization of EVIL DONE, 
by developing a measurement scheme to assess the level of risk to individual targets. More 
specifically, she created a 5-point scale for each of the EVIL DONE features. The combination 
of scores from each of the features provides the overall vulnerability score for each individual 
target (Boba 2009). More recently, researchers have used Boba’s scale in measuring the 
attractiveness of targets across different ideologies and places. For example, EVIL DONE 
measures have been used to assess the attractiveness of targets selected by eco-terrorists in the 
United States (Gruenewald et al., 2015). In addition, Ecki and colleagues (2008) applied the 
EVIL DONE model to targets in Istanbul, Turkey.  
Ideology 
Research has shown ideology to be an important contributing factor in regards to target 
selection (Ahmed, 2018; Asal et al., 2009; Drake, 1998; Hoffman, 1998). As a result of this, 
criminologists have begun to apply situational crime prevention, focusing specifically on a single 
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ideological category or comparing two major ideological categories. For example, researchers 
have applied situational crime prevention focusing only on the extreme far-right movement 
(Belli and Freilich, 2009; Klein et al., 2016) and eco-terrorists. Gruenewald also compared 
incident factors between far-right and Islamic extremists (Gruenewald et al., 2018). Focusing on 
a single ideology or comparison between two ideologies allows for scholars to identify other 
potential factors influencing target selection within certain ideological groups or compared 
across groups. 
Group Structure and Plan Cycle  
The size and structure of terrorist groups can influence the amount of resources and 
knowledge applied to a terrorist plot. Focusing on lone wolf terrorists, Becker (2014) finds that, 
in comparison to larger organizations, lone wolfs are restricted by the weapons they have 
available to use. While the majority of terrorist organizations use explosives to commit attacks, 
lone wolfs predominately relied on firearms. This has a direct impact on the type of targets being 
selected based in part on the level of destruction that can be caused with the available weapons 
(Becker, 2014). While examining leadership roles amongst militant groups in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa, Abrahams and Potter (2015) found that militant groups with leadership 
deficiencies were more likely to target civilians than those with more centralized leadership and 
organized command. These studies demonstrate the importance of group structure and how it can 
impact the targets that terrorists select to attack.  
The planning process is another important factor when considering target selection. In 
examining auto-biographies of terrorists, Gill and colleagues (2018) examine factors of decision 
making when it comes to planning and committing incidents. Their findings suggest variance in 
the planning process are a result of the complexity of the planned attack as well as their 
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awareness of counterterrorism efforts. For example, one offender considered himself an “alert 
opportunist” only “half-looking for vulnerable targets” while another offender spent a much 
longer time planning his attacks, whom “never stopped looking for military targets” (Gill et al., 
2018 p.3) 
Based on the review of the current literature, there are a few gaps in the research that the 
current study seeks to fill. When examining target selection by terrorists, prior research has 
generally focused on predicting how target selection influences the ultimate success of incidents. 
There has yet to be a study that seeks to predict target type as the outcome variable, measuring 
how the background and situational factors vary across target types. In addition, most studies on 
target selection focus on factors shaping the decision-making process independently, while there 
is less known about how these variables and factors operate in combination within particular 
contexts. I also concur with Morris (2015) who suggests there is limited research that examines 
the environmental factors that make targets appear more attractive and vulnerable to terrorist 
attack. The current study seeks to add to the growing body of research on terrorist target 
selection by examining how situational and other environmental factors shape target selection 






Using situational crime prevention as a guiding framework, the purpose of this study is to 
examine the situational characteristics that shape target selection of terrorist attacks in the United 
States. In addition, I will compare situational factors shaping target selection decision-making for 
terrorists associated with the extreme far-right and Islamic extremism, as they currently pose the 
most serious threat to the United States. The current study will seek to answer two main 
questions:  
 
Research Question 1 - How do situational factors and target-specific attributes of 
attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection? 
Research Question 1a - How do particular combinations of situational factors and 
measures of target attractiveness shape terrorists’ target selection?  
 
 Using situational crime prevention as a guiding framework, the current study seeks to 
answer the research questions with the five main hypotheses related to how target selection is 
shaped by situational incident characteristics. While measures of target attractiveness are 
included within the study to explore the relationship with target selection, I have not included 
them in the hypotheses as there is little prior research to help guide my research expectations.  
H1 Islamic extremists are more likely to select government than citizenry targets in 
comparison to far-right extremists. 
H1a Islamic extremists are more likely to select human targets than non-human targets in 
comparison to far-right extremists. 
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H2 The higher the weapon sophistication used, the more likely terrorists will select a 
government target instead of citizenry. 
H2a The higher the weapon sophistication used, the more likely terrorists will select a 
human target than non-human target. 
H3  Groups are more likely to select government targets than citizenry targets in 
 comparison to terrorists operating alone. 
H3a  Groups are more likely to select human targets than non- human targets in 
 comparison to terrorists operating alone. 
H4  The longer the planning cycle, the more likely terrorists will select a government 
 target instead of citizenry. 
H4a The longer the planning cycle, the more likely terrorists will select a human target 
 instead of a non-human target. 
H5 The longer the distance traveled to the target, the more likely terrorists will select a 
government target instead of citizenry. 
H5a The longer the distance traveled to target, the more likely terrorists will select a 
human target instead of a non-human target. 
 
Data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) 
This project will utilize data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) housed in the 
Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas. The ATS is an open-source database 
that contains information on terrorism-related criminal cases in which individuals are indicted in 
 
 18 
a United States federal court. Information is systematically collected from court records that have 
either been gathered directly from court record repositories across the country or digitally 
through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. Supplemental 
information on terrorists and their crimes is also gathered from online news sources.   
Incidents are defined in this study as any failed, foiled or completed attack within the 
United States in which an individual (or group) took one or more preparatory steps toward the 
commission of the planned terrorist act. Threats to commit a terrorist attack are not considered an 
incident of terrorism unless they are linked to an observable preparatory step by perpetrators 
(e.g., conducting surveillance, purchasing weapons) as evidenced in court records. While there 
are debates within the terrorism literature on how to define terrorism (Borum 2014; Ganor, 2002; 
Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012), only terrorism incidents adhering to the FBI’s definition of 
domestic terrorism are included in the ATS. The FBI defines domestic terrorism as:  
“use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating 
entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. (FBI, 2005, p. V) 
 
To date, the American Terrorism Study includes data on over 500 failed, foiled or 
completed incidents dating back to 1980. In order to measure situational factors associated with 
target selection, only incidents with known target locations were included, thus reducing the 
sample to 440 unique incidents. This eliminated incidents where the specific target is unknown. 
An example would be when a perpetrator is indicted for making plans to attack a mosque but a 
specific mosque is never identified. Therefore, the exact target is unknown and is not included in 
the sample. The sample was then reduced even further to account for the ideological categories 
of far-right and Islamic extremists. From this, the sample of 211 unique incidents committed by 
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far-right or Islamic extremists with identified target locations ranging from 1980 to current was 
generated.  
For the current study, several situational and event-level characteristics of terrorism 
incidents, including weapon type, group status, and the length of terrorist planning cycle were 
collected from ATS incidents. In addition, levels of perceived attractiveness and vulnerability of 
the selected targets are measured. To examine how terrorist’s geospatial proximity to targets 
might shape their decision-making, information on residential and target locations was collected 
and geocoded, thus allowing for distance traveled to be measured. These results might shape 
insight on terrorist decision-making. The following section provides more in-depth details on 
how each of the variables in the study are measured.  
Dependent Variable 
The primary dependent variable for the study the type of target selected by terrorists. One 
issue that arises from previous research is the vast array of target type measures. As there is no 
clear and concise way to best measure target type, the current study explores two unique and 
separate ways of measuring target type: Government/Citizenry targets and Human/Non-human 
targets.  
Government targets are those that are owned or operated by the federal, state or local 
government such as federal buildings, court houses and military bases. Citizenry targets are those 
that are not owned or operated by the government, but are privately owned or operated, and 
include targets such as businesses, media outlets and religious institutions. Attacks against 
individuals are considered citizenry targets as well. The second target types outcomes of interest 
include human and non-human targets. Human targets are a result of any attack that injures or 
kills at least one individual. Incidents that were foiled before they could occur were assessed 
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whether the purpose of the attack was to injure/kill civilians. While certain incidents may have 
occurred at a building such as a business or government office, if the intended target was the 
civilians inside the building and not the physical structure itself, it was coded as human targets. 
As such, non-human targets are those that did not injure/kill anyone or had no purpose in doing 
so and were focused solely on the physical structure. For example, vandalism of a historical 
statue or destruction of a religious building are attacks against non-human targets.  
Independent Variables 
Weapon Sophistication 
The first independent variable included is weapon sophistication. Following the work of 
previous ATS research (Smith et al., 2016), weapon sophistication is coded as an ordinal 
measure ranging from low (0), moderate (1), and high (2) levels of sophistication. Weapon 
sophistication measures the availability of weapons in combination with the level of knowledge 
required to build (if necessary) and operate the specific weapon. Weapons of low sophistication 
are easily accessed by the public and require little to no knowledge to operate them (e.g., 
baseball bats, knives, etc.). Moderate sophistication includes weapons that take some skill, 
training, or previous handling to operate (e.g., firearms and vehicles). High sophistication 
weapons are those that are not easily accessible and require above average skills to build and/or 
operate, such as improvised explosive devices (IED) or biological weapons. Terrorism incidents 
that involve multiple weapons are coded for the weapon type that has the highest level of 
sophistication.  
Length of Planning Process 
The length of the planning process is included as a key independent variable to capture 
how long terrorists plan and prepare before executing an attack. The planning process is an 
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interval measure available in the ATS that codes the number of days from date of the first 
preparatory event to the date of the executed incident or when it was planned to occur. Previous 
studies have grouped interval measures of the planning process into ordinal categories (Smith et 
al., 2016). This approach is adopted in the current study as well.   
Terrorist Group Structure 
Terrorist group structure captures the number of people involved in planning, preparing 
and committing the incident. Loners are those actors that acted completely alone, having no help 
with the planning or committing of the incident. While they may be affiliated with a known 
terrorist organization, they had no help with any stage of the incident process. Groups are those 
terrorists that operated with 2 or more people, either within the planning process or committing 
the actual incident.  
Distance to Target 
The final independent variable is distance to target, which measures how far (in miles) 
the preparator(s) traveled or were planning to travel from their residence to a target location. 
Addresses of both perpetrator residences and target locations are collected and geo-coded in the 
ATS along with their respective latitude and longitude coordinates. Using Google Maps, each 
perpetrator residence and target location are mapped and distances from perpetrator residence to 
the corresponding target locations are calculated. For incidents that have multiple perpetrators 
involved, and thus have multiple residences linked to a single incident, the average distance 
traveled is calculated to produce a single measure. Distance to target is then recoded into a 






The final group of variables seek to measure the attractiveness for each target selected by 
terrorists. As discussed previously, Clarke and Newman (2006) introduced EVIL DONE as an 
acronym for describing the attributes of potential terrorist targets. The current study will only 
focus on four measures proposed by Clarke and Newman: Exposed, Vital, Destructible and 
Occupied.  
Exposed measures the accessibility of the potential target to the public. Accessible targets 
are those that are open to the public either day or night without special permission or access. As 
such, inaccessible targets are those that require some form or permission or special access and 
are not available for visitation by the general public. Vital measures how important a target is to 
the functioning of everyday operations of the specific organization. Vital targets would not allow 
the organization to function in its day-to-day activities whereas non-vital targets would still be 
able to operate. For example, a courthouse would be a vital target as the court system of that 
particular city would be greatly impacted if destroyed. Destructible measures how easily the 
target can be destroyed in an attack. Targets that can be destroyed by conventional weapons 
and/or firearms would be considered easily destructible. Larger targets that would require a 
single or multiple explosive device to destroy are coded as difficult to destroy. Occupied 
measures the level of potential victims present within a target site, either unoccupied or 
occupied. 
Analytical Strategy 
The first type of analysis that is used is bivariate analysis, including chi-square tests to 
examine how the relationship of situational and background factors compare across target types 
for both far-right and Islamic incidents. In addition, binary logistic regression is used to assess 
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the statistical relationship between each independent variable and the binary-coded outcome 
variables, net the effects of all other independent variables.  
It is recognized that traditional bivariate and multivariate regression models are limited 
by considering the effects of independent in isolation when it is possible (and likely) that factors 
shaping target selection operate in combination with one another. To address this concern, the 
study supplements the bivariate and multivariate models with Conjunctive Analysis of Case 
Configurations (or “conjunctive analysis”) to examine how particular configurational profiles of 
independent variables are more or less associated with particular types of targets.  
Conjunctive analysis, first introduced into criminology by Meithe, Hart and Regoeczi 
(2008), explores the probability of particular independent variables across the dependent 
variable. Conjunctive analysis creates a matrix table or truth table for all possible configurations 
of each variable, with a dichotomous dependent variable. If a strong relationship exists amongst 
the possible combinations, then the identified combinations will be clustered together rather than 
spread across all of the potential configurations. This helps identify which configurations are 













This chapter presents the results of the current study. The first section begins with 
descriptive statistics for all variables that were included in one or more of the analyses. The 
second section provides results from the bivariate analysis, including the statistical relationship 
between each independent and dependent variable. Third, a description of findings from the 
multivariate analyses using binary logistic regression follows. Fourth, and finally, findings are 
presented from conjunctive analysis examining how ideology and key situational variables 
operate in combination with one another to shape specific outcomes of interest.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 displays the frequency and percentages of all independent and dependent 
variables. All variables for this analysis except for weapon type were binary coded. Missing data 
was generally not an issue in this study, with data missing in less than 20 percent of cases for 
most variables. Due to the challenges of identifying when terrorist plots originated (i.e., data of 
first preparatory act) and limited publicly available information about these acts, data for terrorist 
plan cycle are missing for 35 percent of cases.  
Table 1 reveals that the majority of targets selected by terrorists in general were human 
targets, while only 34 percent of targets were non-human targets. This is not too surprising as 
one of the primary goals of terrorist attacks is to inflict as much damage and human casualties as 
possible. There is less variation across government and citizen target types. Government targets 
account for 51.5 percent of the selected targets, while citizen targets account for 48.5 percent of 




Table 1. Frequency Distributions for all Variables 
Variables   Frequency % 
Ideology Far-right 120 56.9 
 Islamic Extremist 91 43.1 
Weapon Type Low Sophistication 53 27.3 
 Moderate Sophistication 48 24.7 
 High Sophistication 93 47.9 
Group Structure Loner 86 41.3 
 Group 122 58.7 
Plan Cycle 0 – 90 days 60 43.5 
 91+ days 78 56.5 
Distance to Target 30 miles or less 109 61.9 
 31+ miles 67 38.1 
Exposed Accessible 143 70.1 
 Inaccessible 61 29.9 
Vital Vital 130 63.7 
 Non-Vital 74 36.3 
Destructible Easily Destructible 115 56.7 
 Difficult to Destroy 88 43.3 
Occupied Unoccupied 57 28.8 
 Occupied 141 71.2 
Human/Non-human Human 139 65.9 
 Non-human 72 34.1 
Government/Citizenry Government 104 51.5 
  Citizenry 98 48.5 
 
Figure 1 displays the temporal variation of all terrorism incidents included in the current 
study (n=211). The years of terrorism incidents range from 1983 to 2019 and are grouped in 5-
year increments. The overall trend shows an increase in the number of incidents since the 1980s. 
The number of incidents remains fairly stable through the mid 90’s, followed by sharp increases 
in the early 2000’s and into the 2010’s. The number of incidents reaches its peak in 2009 – 2013 
and slightly declines into the later 2010’s. Due to how cases are coded in the ATS, the sample 
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does not include all incidents in 2019. In addition, because terrorism incidents are not added to 
the ATS until cases are closed, findings for more recent cases should be interpreted with caution.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Terrorist Incidents Across Time  
Bivariate Analysis 
 Since each of the independent variables are categorical and the dependent variable is 
coded dichotomously, cross tabs and associated chi-square tests were run to test for statistical 
significance across target types. Table 2 displays the results for each independent variable across 
government targets and citizenry targets. Examining the situational variables, ideology and 
weapon type had a significant relationship with target type (p ≤ 0.05). While the majority of far-
right incidents (56.8%) were against citizens, the opposite occurs for Islamic extremist incidents, 
as 63.1 percent were against government targets, providing some initial support for Hypothesis 1. 
Supportive of Hypothesis 2, findings show that as sophistication of weapons increases, the 
likelihood that terrorists will select government targets compared to citizenry targets also 






























moderate (52.5%) and high sophisticated weapons (57.3%) are relatively more associated with 
government targets. Findings in Table 2 also indicate that the majority of terrorists who operate 
alone (59%) selected government targets, while those operating in groups chose to target 
citizens, though differences were not statistically significant. In addition, incidents that occurred 
30 miles or less from the perpetrator’s residence were most commonly associated with 
government targets (59.2%), though the opposite was true for those that occurred 31+ miles 
away. The relationship between distance traveled and target type was statistically significant at 
the p ≤ 0.01 level, but in the opposite direction as expected, thus failing to support Hypothesis 5 at 
the bivariate level. Drawing from crime pattern theory, it would be expected that within the 
shorter distance of their routine movements, terrorists are more likely to come in contact with 
citizen targets more often than government targets. However, the results from the bivariate 
analysis did not support the expected results.  
 Shifting to measures of target attractiveness, measures of exposure and destructibility 
were significantly related to target selection, whereas vital and occupied measures were not. As 
expected, targets accessible to the public were predominately citizen targets, whereas those 
deemed inaccessible to the public were government targets. A similar pattern is evident with 
destructibility. The majority of targets that are the easiest to destroy were those associated with 
citizens (55%), while those that are difficult to destroy more often reflected government targets 
(60%). Importantly, bivariate analyses reveal variation in target attractiveness measures, 
suggesting that not all government targets are inaccessible or difficult to destroy, while the 





Table 2. Bivariate Findings Across Government and Citizenry Targets  




(n) % Total 
Ideology ** Far-right 51 43.2 67 56.8 118 
n=202 Islamic extremist 53 63.1 31 36.9 84 
       
Weapon Type * Low Sophistication 18 35.3 33 64.7 51 
n=186 
Moderate 
Sophistication 24 52.2 22 47.8 46 
 High Sophistication 51 57.3 38 42.7 89 
       
Group Structure ±  Loner 49 59.0 34 41.0 83 
n=199 Group 54 46.6 62 53.4 116 
       
Plan Cycle 0 – 90 days 27 46.6 31 53.4 58 
n=135 91+ days 39 50.6 38 49.4 77 
       
Distance to Target 
±  30 miles or less 61 59.2 42 40.8 103 
n=169 31+ miles 30 45.5 36 54.0 66 
       
Exposed ** Accessible 54 39.4 83 60.6 137 
n=195 Inaccessible 46 79.3 12 20.0 58 
       
Vital Vital 66 53.2 58 46.8 124 
n=196 Non-Vital 37 51.4 35 48.6 72 
       
Destructible * Easily Destructible 49 45.0 60 55.0 109 
n=194 Difficult to Destroy 51 60.0 34 40.0 85 
       
Occupied Unoccupied 27 50.0 27 50.0 54 
n=189 Occupied 71 52.6 64 47.4 135 
± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01      
 
Table 3 displays bivariate results for each independent variable across human and non-
human targets. Situational variables, including ideology, weapon type, group structure and plan 
cycle significantly vary (p ≤ 0.01) across the target type. Far-right terrorists fairly evenly selected 
human and non-human targets, while Islamic extremists more commonly targeted human targets 
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(89%), indicating some initial support for Hypothesis 1a. As expected, (Hypothesis 2a), low 
sophisticated weapons were most commonly used against non-human targets, while moderate 
and high sophisticated weapons, such as firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were 
predominately used to target humans to cause injuries and casualties. Human targets include 
attacks against facilities with the intent of targeting the civilians inside the building and not 
simply the physical structure itself. Non-human targets are solely structural attacks, such as 
vandalism of religious symbols or destruction of abortion clinics and therefore often rely on less 
sophisticated weapons. Of incidents that were perpetrated by groups, 74.6 percent were against 
human targets, as expected (Hypothesis 3a). The shorter plan cycles (0 – 90 days) were evenly 
distributed at 50 percent across human and non-human targets, while the longer plan cycles (91+ 
days) were most common amongst human targets (78.2%), thus supporting Hypothesis 4a. Since 
there is no significant statistical difference between distance to target and target type amongst 
human and non-human targets, the findings fail to provide initial support for Hypothesis 5a. 
Instead, target exposure was the only significant measure of attractiveness to vary significantly 
across human and non-human targets (p ≤ 0.01).  
 
Table 3. Bivariate Findings Across Human and Non-human Targets  




(n) % Total 
Ideology ** Far-right 58 48.3 62 51.7 120 
n=211 Islamic Extremist 81 89.0 10 11.0 91 
       
Weapon Type ** Low Sophistication 24 45.3 29 54.7 53 
n=194 Moderate Sophistication 38 79.2 10 20.8 48 
 High Sophistication 66 71.0 27 29.0 93 
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Table 3. Bivariate Findings Across Human and Non-human Targets (Cont.)1  




(n) % Total 
Group Structure ** Loner 46 53.5 40 46.5 86 
n=208 Group 91 74.6 31 25.4 122 
       
Plan Cycle ** 0 – 90 days 30 50.0 30 50.0 60 
n=138 91+ days 61 78.2 17 21.8 78 
       
Distance to Target 30 miles or less 68 62.4 41 37.6 109 
n=176 31+ miles 45 67.2 22 32.8 67 
       
Exposed ** Accessible 84 58.7 59 41.3 143 
n=204 Inaccessible 49 80.3 12 19.7 61 
       
Vital Vital 89 68.5 41 31.5 130 
n=204 Non-Vital 46 62.2 28 37.8 74 
       
Destructible  Easily Destructible 76 66.1 39 33.9 115 
n=203 Difficult to Destroy 60 68.2 28 31.8 88 
       
Occupied  Unoccupied 0 0.0 57 100.0 57 
n=198 Occupied 130 92.2 11 7.8 141 
± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01      
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 The next step was to examine how each situational measure and target attractiveness 
characteristic were statistically associated with terrorist target selection, net the effects of other 
factors, using multivariate analyses. Table 4 displays the results of the binary logistic regression 
models, predicting government versus citizenry terrorist target selection. The model includes all 
of the situational variables that were found to be significant in the bivariate analysis.2 The 
 
1 The occupied measure was not included in the analysis because of its near perfect statistical relationship with the 
outcome of interest. 
2 Due to the exploratory nature of the study and relatively small sample size, multivariate analyses only include 
independent variables that were found to be statistically significant at the bivariate level. 
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statistically significant target attractiveness characteristics were also added to the model to test 
the effects of each independent variable, while controlling for all other variables.3  
Table 4. Predicting Target Type (Government vs. Citizenry) Using Binary Logistic Regression 
Variables b(SE) Exp(B) 
Situational Factors   
   Group Actors1 0.918 (.454)* 2.504 
   High Sophistication Weapons2 -0.886 (.437)* 0.412 
   Long Distance to Target (31+ miles)3 0.581 (.398) 1.787 
   Islamic extremist4 -0.671 (.408) ±  0.511 
Significant Target Attractiveness Factors   
   Inaccessible5 -1.825 (.491) ** 0.161 
   Difficult to Destroy6 -0.029 (.452) 0.971 
Constant .416 (.343) 1.516 
 R-Square 0.256  
-2 Log likelihood 166.297   
± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01   
Reference Categories: 1 Lone Actors, 2 Low/Mod Sophisticated Weapons, 3 Short Distance to 
Target (30 miles or less), 4 Far-right extremist, 5 Accessible, 6 Easily Destructible 
 
 Beginning with the situational incident characteristics, group actors significantly varied 
with the type of terrorist target selection (p ≤ 0.05). The positive statistical relationship indicates 
that groups were more likely to select citizenry targets in comparison to lone actors, thus failing 
to support Hypothesis 3. Government targets are typically more secure in comparison to citizenry 
targets and therefore would require more resources and planning to successfully attack. Since 
group actors have more combined resources than those acting alone, situational crime prevention 
would suggest that groups would then have more available opportunities to attack more fortified 
targets, however this did not appear to be the case. Instead, this relationship could be a result of a 
relatively small number of terrorist groups that targeted private citizens in spree attacks. For 
 
3 Model diagnostic tests indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue across multivariate models.  
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example, in the 1980’s a group known as the Nation of Yahweh targeted individuals who 
opposed their ideology in a number of planned attacks.     
Highly sophisticated weapons were also a significant predictor (p ≤ 0.05) of government 
and citizen targets. As weapon sophistication increased, the likelihood of selecting citizenry 
targets decreased, showing support for Hypothesis 2, aligning with the bivariate results. High 
sophisticated weapons are more likely to be associated with government targets rather than 
citizen targets in comparison to low sophisticated weapons. Government targets often have 
higher levels of security measures for protection in comparison to citizen targets. It would 
require stronger, more sophisticated weapons such as explosives in order to combat these more 
advanced security measures. Therefore, it is likely that reasoning terrorists are more likely to 
select government targets rather than citizen targets when more sophisticated weapons and 
suitable opportunities are available to them. 
As shown in Table 4, incidents perpetrated by Islamic extremists are statistically and 
negatively associated with target selection (p ≤ 0.1). This means that Islamic extremists are more 
likely to select government targets than citizenry targets compared to far-right extremists, which 
is supportive of Hypothesis 1. Distance to target was not a significant predictor of target 
selection, thus failing to support Hypothesis 5. Of target attractiveness measures that were added 
to the model, exposure is strongly significant (p ≤ 0.01) at predicting government or citizen 
targets. Targets that are unexposed, or inaccessible to the public, are more likely to associated 
with government targets compared to those that are relatively more accessible to the public. This 
could be indicative that government targets more often require special permissions or access 
badges to enter which are not given to the public. While statistically significant in the bivariate 
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analysis, destructibility is not statistically significant in the multivariate analysis for this 
particular outcome variable.    
 Table 5 displays the results of the binary logistic regression model predicting human and 
non-human target selection by terrorists. Similar to the previous model, Table 5 includes all of 
the situational and target attractiveness measures found to be statistically significant in previous 
bivariate analyses.  
 
Table 5. Predicting Target Type (Human vs Non-Human) Using Binary Logistic Regression 
Variables b(SE) Exp(B) 
Situational Factors   
   Group Actors1 -0.556 (.509) 0.573 
   High Sophisticated Weapons2 1.008 (.576) ± 2.741 
   Long Plan Cycle 3 -1.905 (.572) ** 0.149 
   Islamic Extremist4 -3.398 (.742) ** 0.033 
Significant Target Attractiveness Factors   
   Inaccessible5 -0.211 (.732) 0.81 
Constant 1.2 (.467) 3.321 
 R-Square 0.485  
-2 Log likelihood 106.506   
± p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01   
Reference Categories: 1 Lone Actors, 2 Low/Mod Sophisticated Weapons, 3 Short plan cycle 
4Far-right extremist, 5 Accessible   
 
 Beginning with the situational incident variables, ideology (p ≤ 0.01) and plan cycle (p ≤ 
0.01) were significant predictors of human versus non-human target types. Specifically, Islamic 
extremists were more likely to select human targets than non-human targets in comparison to far-
right extremist, as expected (Hypothesis 1a). This makes sense since Islamic extremists often 
target people who do not adhere to their specific religious beliefs in mass casualty attacks. 
Similar to the results from bivariate analysis, findings from multivariate analysis indicate that the 
longer the length of terrorists’ planning cycle, the more likely terrorists would select human 
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targets in comparison to non-human targets, thus supporting Hypothesis 4a. It is assumed that 
like other criminals, terrorists are rational beings that weigh the costs and benefits when planning 
an attack to reduce the likelihood of being caught by law enforcement. Attacks against human 
targets typically require more sophisticated plots to have successful outcomes in comparison to 
attacks against non-human targets. All other variables are either significant only at the p ≤ 0.1 
level or are not statistically significant. Therefore, hypotheses related to weapon type target type 
fail to support Hypothesis 2a. Moreover, unlike the previous model predicting government 
versus citizen target selection, target exposure was not a significant predictor of human versus 
non-human target selection.  
Conjunctive Analysis  
The final form of analysis was conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC) to 
examine which combinations of variables were most associated with the selection of particular 
types of targets by terrorists. While binary logistic regression is useful for revealing how each 
independent variable is statistically related to target selection outcomes, CACC indicates how 
ideological and situational variables operate in combination to shape terrorist decision-making. 
As in the previous analysis, only the variables that were significant in bivariate analysis were 
included in CACC. In addition, and following prior terrorism research based on limited samples 
(Gruenewald et al., 2019), only outcomes with five or more cases were included in the analysis. 
Table 6 displays the results of CACC across government and citizenry targets. Some 
combinations were associated with a very high likelihood of terrorists selecting citizens as their 
target. For example, case profile 1 displayed that incidents committed by lone acting far-right 
offenders often used moderately sophisticated weapons and traveled greater than 31 miles select 
targets that were both accessible and easy to destroy which resulted in 100 percent citizenry 
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targets. Other configurations were associated with a very high likelihood of terrorists selecting 
government targets. For example, profile 11 displays the combination that resulted in 0 percent 
citizenry targets or, in other words, 100 percent government targets. The combination of factors 
was almost the complete opposite of those selecting citizenry targets. Indeed, these incidents 
were committed by Islamic extremist groups that used highly sophisticated weapons and traveled 
less than 30 miles to targets that were inaccessible to the public and difficult to destroy. Being 
able to recognize the patterns of factors associated with government and citizen targets allows 






Table 6. Combinations of Target Type (Government vs Citizenry) Using Conjunctive Analysis 
Case 








Target # Cases 
1 Far-right Moderate Loner Accessible Easy 31+ miles 100 7 
2 Far-right Low Loner Inaccessible Easy ≤ 30 miles  100 5 
3 Far-right High Group Accessible Easy ≤ 30 miles  86 7 
4 Far-right High Group Accessible Difficult 31+ miles 83 6 
5 IE High Group Accessible Difficult 31+ miles 50 6 
6 IE High Group Accessible Difficult ≤ 30 miles  43 8 
7 Far-right Low Loner Accessible Easy ≤ 30 miles  40 11 
8 IE Moderate Loner Accessible Easy ≤ 30 miles  20 6 
9 Far-right High Loner Accessible Easy 31+ miles 20 5 
10 IE High Group Inaccessible Difficult 31+ miles 20 5 
11 IE High Group Inaccessible Difficult ≤ 30 miles  0 6 
12 Far-right High Loner Accessible Easy ≤ 30 miles  0 5 
*IE – Islamic 






 Case profile 7 displays the results for the most commonly occurring configuration 
present within the data (n=11), including far-right lone actors with low weapon sophistication 
that traveled less than 30 miles to targets that were both accessible and easy to destroy. This 
particular case profile was associated with the selection of citizenry targets in 40 percent of 
incidents. The change from moderately sophisticated weapons and distance greater than 30 miles 
(Case Profile 1) to low sophisticated weapons and less than 30 miles (Case Profile 7) resulted in 
a 60 percent decrease in selecting citizenry targets. This shows how changes in just two 
situational factors can have a drastic impact on the likelihood of selecting citizenry targets over 
government targets.  
 Combinations of factors that were most likely to result in selecting citizenry targets were 
far-right perpetrators against targets that were easily destructible and accessible to the public. 
Weapon type, distance to target and lone actor status varied across these case configurations. For 
example, case profiles 1 thru 4 in Table 6 show the combinations most likely to result in 
citizenry targets. Almost all of these configurations involved far-right extremists and accessible 
and easy targets. Within these same configurations though, there was more variation across 
weapon type, group structure, and distance to target.   
 While ideology was found to be a significant contributor while independent of other 
factors in the bivariate and multivariate results, it was particularly relevant in combination with 
other specific situational measures. When comparing case profiles 7 and 8 the combinations of 
factors were similar except for ideology. The change from extreme far-right to Islamic extremist, 
while all other factors remain the same, resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the chances of 
selecting a citizenry target. Another example of this was present in case profiles 8 and 10. While 
ideology remained the same, all other factors flip values. However, even with every factor 
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changing, the likelihood of citizenry targets being selected by terrorists remains the same -- 20 
percent, suggesting that even in combination of all other factors, ideology is a critical factor in 














Structure Exposed Plan Cycle 
% Non-Human 
Target # Cases 
1 Far-right Low Loner Accessible 0 – 90 days 100 11 
2 Far-right High Group Accessible 0 – 90 days 80 5 
3 Far-right Low Group Accessible 0 – 90 days 67 9 
4 Far-right High Loner Accessible 91+ days 60 5 
5 Far-right High Group Accessible 91+ days 44 16 
6 IE High Group Inaccessible 91+ days 20 5 
7 IE High Group Accessible 91+ days 0 11 
8 Far-right Moderate Loner Accessible 91+ days 0 5 




Table 7 displays the results of CACC with human and non-human target types. Some 
combinations resulted in a very high likelihood of selecting human targets, while other 
combinations resulted in a high likelihood of selecting non-human targets. The combination of 
extreme far-right lone actors with low sophisticated weapons that have a shorter plan cycle (0-90 
days) and with targets that were accessible to the public resulted in 100 percent non-human 
targets (Case Profile 1). On the other hand, Case Profile 7 reflects incidents committed by 
Islamic extremist groups with highly sophisticated weapons and a longer plan cycle (91+ days) 
against accessible targets that resulted in 100 percent human targets. 
Interestingly, non-human targets are most commonly selected by far-right extremists that 
used low sophisticated weapons with accessible targets. However, there was variation across 
group structure, as both loners and groups were common among non-human targets. Human 
targets were most commonly associated with high sophisticated weapons and group perpetrators 
with accessible targets. Human target selection was relatively common amongst both extreme 
far-right and Islamic extremists. CACC findings also revealed that non-human targets were most 
commonly associated with a shorter plan cycle and low sophisticated weapons, whereas human 
targets were associated with a longer plan cycle of 91 or more days and moderate/high 
sophisticated weapons. This could be a result of the difficulty of planning a large-scale attack 
with complex weaponry such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to maximize as much 
casualties as possible.  
Conjunctive analysis also revealed group structure is associated with target selection in 
combination with other relevant factors. A change in group structure from loner to group 
decreased the likelihood of selecting a non-human target. For example, case profile 1 and 3 




(Case profile 1) to group actors (Case Profile 3) resulted in a 37 percent decrease in the 
likelihood of selecting a non-human target. The same pattern was present when comparing case 
profiles 4 and 5 as well. With all other factors remaining constant, the change in group structure 











































Discussion and Conclusion 
 Guided by the situational crime prevention framework, the purpose of this study was to 
explore how the situational incident factors and target attractiveness characteristics influence 
terrorist target selection. The following chapter begins by reviewing the key findings from the 
study. Then addresses some implications for counterterrorism policy and practice. Finally, 
limitations of the current study are addressed and suggestions for future research are posited. 
Key Findings   
 This study assumed that terrorists are rational beings and make reasoned choices when 
planning and preparing for an attack. It was also expected that several ideological and situational 
factors impact target selection. Based on bivariate and multivariate findings, it appears that 
ideology and weapon type were two of the most significant factors associated with target 
selection by terrorists.  
 Findings from the bivariate and multivariate analysis were consistent with previous 
findings that ideology influences terrorist target selection (Ahmed, 2018; Asal et al., 2009; 
Drake, 1998; Hoffman, 1998). Islamic extremists were more likely to select government targets 
than citizenry targets compared to far-right extremists. Also, Islamic extremists were more likely 
to select human targets than non-human targets. These findings make sense considering that 
Islamic extremists ultimately seek to weaken foreign governments and eliminate those who do 
not adhere to fundamentalist versions of Islamic teachings.  
 The level of terrorists’ weapon sophistication also significantly influences target selection 
decisions. Highly sophisticated weapons are more likely to be used against government and 




sophisticated weapons. Clarke and Newman (2006) identify weapons as one of the four pillars of 
the terrorist opportunity structure, suggesting that weapons are dependent on the level of 
resources available to the terrorist(s) and are indicative of the level of destruction that can be 
caused. Higher sophisticated weapons, while requiring more knowledge to use and effort to 
obtain, can cause significantly more damage than lower sophisticated weapons. When selecting a 
target, terrorists also consider the amount of death and destruction that is possible. In order to 
maximize the amount of death and destruction, terrorists may utilize highly sophisticated 
weapons, such as IEDs, against targets involving humans rather than non-human or structural 
targets. Government targets are often more secure and protected than citizenry targets and 
therefore terrorists are more likely to use highly sophisticated weapons to overcome these 
protective measures.   
Several other situational factors included in the current study were expected to play an 
important role in terrorists’ target decision-making process, but these hypotheses were not 
supported by the statistical models. Previous research on group structure has found it to have a 
significant impact on target selection (Abrahams and Potter, 2015; Becker, 2014). Lone actors 
are thought to have relatively limited opportunities and available resources needed to commit a 
high-scale terrorist attack. In contrast, group actors typically have more combined resources and 
opportunities to attack increasingly protected targets. The results did not support these 
expectations, as group actors were actually less likely to select government targets than citizens 
compared to lone actors.  
  While previous research has typically examined factors of target selection in isolation of 
one another, it was predicted that these factors operate in particular sets or combinations to more 




case configurations (CACC). The results of the CACC revealed that some configurations of 
ideological and situational factors resulted in increased and decreased chances that terrorists 
would select one type of target over another. In particular, incidents committed by lone acting 
extreme far-right offenders who use moderately sophisticated weapons and travel greater than 31 
miles to attack accessible and easily destroyed targets always result in the selection of citizenry 
targets. Whereas incidents committed by Islamic extremist groups using highly sophisticated 
weapons and travelling less than 30 miles to targets that are publicly inaccessible and difficult to 
destroy always result in the selection of government targets. Comparing human and non-human 
targets, the combination of extreme far-right lone actors with shorter plan cycle (0-90 days) who 
use low sophisticated weapons to target publicly accessible locations always results in the 
selection of non-human targets. In contrast, Islamic extremist groups relying on highly 
sophisticated weapons and longer planning cycles who plan to attack publicly accessible 
locations always results in the selection of human targets.  
Finding that changes in one situational factor can significantly shape the relevance of other 
factors for influencing target selection highlights their interrelatedness and what is missed by 
focusing on the effects of single variables on outcomes of interest in isolation. It is true that some 
factors, such as ideology or weapon type, might carry more weight in the decision-making 
process; however how these factors ultimately shape target selection depends on the presence or 
absence of other relevant situated opportunities. The number of people involved, the length 
terrorists must travel to their selected targets, and how long terrorists plan and prepare for attacks 
pose risks to the viability of terrorist plots. It is the culmination of these factors and their many 






   A major goal of counterterrorism efforts at both the federal and state level is to be 
proactive rather than reactive in responding to terrorism. This study adds to the growing body of 
research on target selection, particularly within the context of terrorism. Being able to identify 
the factors that are significant predictors of target selection can allow for law enforcement 
agencies to be more proactive in identifying future terrorist plots and foiling them.  
 One of the significant factors presented in the study is the type of weapons being used to 
select targets, particularly highly sophisticated weapons. Availability of highly sophisticated 
weapons, including various forms of explosives, increases the opportunities of potential targets 
to more secure facilities, such as government buildings and other large buildings to maximize 
death and destruction. Following the techniques of situational crime prevention (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003), law enforcement should continue increased efforts to disrupt the access of these 
weapons. Reducing availability and illicit access to highly sophisticated weapons could then in 
turn reduce the number of opportunities for future terrorist attacks.  
The results from the conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC) are also 
important in helping law enforcement better identify combinations of factors linked to target 
selection. Identifying patterns most likely to be associated to certain target types, highlights 
targets that are most at risk of being attacked. For example, incidents committed by lone acting 
extreme far-right offenders that use moderately sophisticated weapons are most likely to select 
citizen targets in comparison to government targets. Being able to identify which targets are most 
at risk can then allow law enforcement and other agencies to employ tactics, such as target 




completely protect all potential targets. The findings from this study can help law enforcement 
identify targets that remain at elevated levels of need for protection.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 While this research adds to the growing body of literature on terrorism target selection, it 
does not come without some limitations. One of the major limitations of the study is the 
relatively small sample size. Terrorism itself is a rare event, so statistical analysis must take this 
into account. Focusing only on far-right and Islamic extremists limits the sample size even 
further. While these two major ideologies currently pose the largest threat within the United 
States, we must be cautious applying the results from this study to all forms of terrorism. Future 
research could also focus on far-left and environmental extremists to see if similar patterns exist.    
 Future research is also needed to further explore measures of target attractiveness and 
vulnerability within the context of terrorism. The current study includes some target 
attractiveness measures, however prior research provides little guidance in how to operationalize 
these variables outside of major urban centers and for more common types of targets, including 
businesses and private citizens. Expanding the scope of future research to include multiple 
ideologies and target types will serve to refine the utility of situational crime prevention as a 
framework for understanding terrorism through the eyes of terrorists, and will aid law 
enforcement in increasing the costs and reducing the rewards for this serious type of crime.  
Conclusion 
 This study adds to the growing body of literature examining target selection, specifically 
as it relates to terrorism. Using data from the American Terrorism Study, the results indicate that 
situational factors such as ideology and weapon sophistication are significant predictors of target 




but rather the result of multiple factors structuring terrorists’ opportunities to plan, prepare, and 
execute attacks. The findings from this study inform law enforcement and other stakeholders 
about the factors shaping terrorists’ decisions to target one type of target over another. Guided by 
situational crime prevention, anti-terrorism efforts should be target and ideology-specific, and 
centered around reducing future risk of attacks, for instance, by reducing the rewards and 
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